Views: 0 Author: Joy Publish Time: 2025-04-29 Origin: Site
Just last week, the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued a major warning: the trajectory of global trade growth is being fundamentally disrupted. This report, based on new data models and policy assumptions, reassessed the global trade and economic trends in 2025 and 2026.
1. Trade could have recovered, but it was backfired by policy "headwinds"
2024 is a slightly warmer year. Global merchandise trade volume increased by 2.9%, service trade increased by 6.8%, and global GDP rebounded at a pace of 2.8%. This is the first time since 2017 that "trade growth is faster than economic growth". However, this trend did not continue into the new year. At the beginning of 2025, with a series of tariff policies represented by the United States heating up again, the original WTO forecast of 2.7% growth in merchandise trade dropped sharply to -0.2%. In other words, if there were no new tariffs, this should have been a year of continued recovery. What is more alarming is that this downward revision is not limited to fine-tuning at the "digital level". The report pointed out that if the currently suspended "reciprocal tariffs" are re-implemented in the future, global merchandise trade growth will be further depressed by 0.6 percentage points; and if the uncertainty of trade policies around the world spreads to non-US-related trade systems, it will cause a further drag of 0.8 percentage points. Under the combined effect, global merchandise trade volume may shrink by 1.5%, repeating the scenario of "policy-led recession".
2. Regional impact differentiation, China and LDCs seek gap opportunities against the trend
Under the impact of global tariffs, regional performance will show an unprecedented differentiation pattern. North America will become the main "negative contributor" to global trade growth, and is expected to lower global growth by 1.7 percentage points. Although Asia is still a positive contributor, its growth rate has been "halved" to 0.6 percentage points, and Europe's performance has also been slightly revised down. But it is worth noting that while the United States has drastically cut imports from China, China's exports to other regions are expected to grow by 4% to 9%, especially in areas such as electrical equipment, textiles and clothing. This also makes some of the least developed countries (LDCs) whose export structures are highly overlapping with China usher in structural "export substitution opportunities". The WTO model shows that the growth rate of merchandise exports of LDCs in 2025 is expected to rise from 3.5% to 4.8%. This seemingly "counter-trend" performance actually stems from the current trend of highly fragmented global trade networks. When the global trade pattern is redrawn by geopolitics, third countries may receive unexpected dividends from the trade redistribution effect, provided that they have production capacity, system and market resilience.
3. Service trade: the victim of non-tariff "spillover damage"
In the public's impression, service trade does not seem to be affected by tariffs. However, the WTO report for the first time included the "volume" forecast of service trade into the model, revealing another vulnerability of service trade: it is highly dependent on commodity trade and market confidence. In 2025, the growth rate of global service trade is expected to slow down from 6.8% in 2024 to 4.0%. Among them: • Transportation services will only grow by 0.5% due to the reduction in global cargo flows, far lower than the previous forecast of 2.9%; • Travel services are expected to grow from 4.2% to 2.6% due to insufficient consumer confidence and changes in visa policies; • Digital services remain resilient, but have also been adjusted down from 6.6% to 5.6%. This "chain decline" of service trade sends an important signal: tariffs not only change the import and export structure, but also weaken global investment, transportation, logistics and consumption expectations, thereby shaking the confidence foundation of economic recovery.
4. Global Reshaping under Structural Inflation and Policy Game
In addition to direct import and export changes, this round of policy shocks has quietly changed the foundation of the global economy through the path of "structural inflation". The report pointed out that the new round of tariffs not only raised the prices of imported goods, but also may cause repeated inflation expectations through cost transmission and wage growth. If the central bank is forced to continue to maintain high interest rates, investment willingness will further decline, and ultimately drag down global actual demand. At the same time, the medium- and long-term trade imbalance structure is also being rewritten. The global value chain, which used to be guided by optimal efficiency, is now being reshaped by non-economic factors such as geopolitics, industrial security, and local employment. The WTO analysis believes that the uncertainty of trade policy itself has become an "invisible tariff", which imposes additional costs on corporate decision-making.
5. Re-evaluate foreign trade positioning and risk framework from a structural perspective.
This WTO report is of great significance to Chinese companies, especially foreign trade-oriented manufacturers and service providers, not only in terms of digital forecasts, but also in reminding us what kind of "de-globalization" new normal we are in: trade policy risks must be incorporated into the corporate strategic decision-making model, not only focusing on policies that have come into effect, but also assessing the lag effect and regional linkage of policies. Global supply chain adjustments are creating "alternative opportunities", especially in the field of low-end and medium-end manufacturing, and competition or cooperation with LDCs or other Asian countries should be re-examined. Digitalization and high value-added services have become the new benchmark for enterprises' "anti-disturbance capabilities", especially in the fields of transportation, software, AI, cross-border professional services, etc. SMEs and industrial parks need to build more flexible market and policy response mechanisms to reduce the "concentration risks" brought about by single market or policy dependence.
